Balance Sheet Effects on Monetary and Financial Spillovers: The East Asian Crisis Plus 20 by Aizenman, Joshua et al.
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Economics Faculty Publications and 
Presentations Economics 
6-1-2017 
Balance Sheet Effects on Monetary and Financial 
Spillovers: The East Asian Crisis Plus 20 
Joshua Aizenman 
University of Southern California 
Menzie D. Chinn 
Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs 
Hiro Ito 
Portland State University, ito@pdx.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Citation Details 
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2017). Balance sheet effects on monetary and financial spillovers: 
The East Asian crisis plus 20. Journal of International Money and Finance. 
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make 
this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS ON MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SPILLOVERS:










The financial support of faculty research funds of University of Southern California, the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Portland State University is gratefully acknowledged. All 
remaining errors are ours. We would like to thank Kenichi Ueda and the participants at the 
Pacific Rim and the Global Economy University of Tokyo conference, July 25-26, 2016 for their 
useful comments. Any errors are ours. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been 
peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies 
official NBER publications.
© 2016 by Joshua Aizenman, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito. All rights reserved. Short sections 
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that 
full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Balance Sheet Effects on Monetary and Financial Spillovers: The East Asian Crisis Plus 20
Joshua Aizenman, Menzie D. Chinn, and Hiro Ito




We study how the financial conditions in the Center Economies [the U.S., Japan, and the Euro 
area] impact other countries over the period 1986 through 2015. Our methodology relies upon a 
two-step approach. We focus on five possible linkages between the center economies (CEs) and 
the non-Center economics, or peripheral economies (PHs), and investigate the strength of these 
linkages. For each of the five linkages, we first regress a financial variable of the PHs on financial 
variables of the CEs while controlling for global factors. Next, we examine the determinants of 
sensitivity to the CEs as a function of country-specific macroeconomic conditions and policies, 
including the exchange rate regime, currency weights, monetary, trade and financial linkages with 
the CEs, the levels of institutional development, and international reserves. Extending our 
previous work (Aizenman et al. (2016)), we devote special attention to the impact of currency 
weights in the implicit currency basket, balance sheet exposure, and currency composition of 
external debt. We find that for both policy interest rates and the real exchange rate (REER), the 
link with the CEs has been pervasive for developing and emerging market economies in the last 
two decades, although the movements of policy interest rates are found to be more sensitive to 
global financial shocks around the time of the emerging markets’ crises in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and since 2008. When we estimate the determinants of the extent of connectivity, we 
find evidence that the weights of major currencies, external debt, and currency compositions of 
debt are significant factors. More specifically, having a higher weight on the dollar (or the euro) 
makes the response of a financial variable such as the REER and exchange market pressure in the 
PHs more sensitive to a change in key variables in the U.S. (or the euro area) such as policy 
interest rates and the REER. While having more exposure to external debt would have similar 
impacts on the financial linkages between the CEs and the PHs, the currency composition of 
international debt securities does matter. Economies more reliant on dollar-denominated debt 
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On the eve of the 20th year anniversary of the East Asian crisis, we investigate the impact 
of balance sheet exposures, economic structure and trilemma choices on the exposure of 
countries to shocks emanating from the center.  Events over recent decades have vividly 
illustrated that balance sheet exposure impact monetary and fiscal spaces, capital mobility, and 
exchange market pressure.  The evolution of global dynamics during the post-Global Financial 
Crisis period led Rey (2013) to propound the hypothesis that exchange rate regimes no longer 
insulate countries from global financial cycles – in other words, the demise of the Mundellian 
Trilemma.  In this paper, however, we investigate whether Rey’s view means the end of the 
trilemma hypothesis or a prematurely prediction that is not supported by the data. In order to 
gain further insights regarding these developments, we examine how the financial conditions of -
- and shocks propagated from -- the Center Economies [dubbed CEs, namely the U.S., Japan, and 
the Euro area], impact the non CEs economics. Extending our previous work (Aizenman et al. 
(2016)), we devote special attention to the impact of currency weights in the implicit currency 
basket, balance sheet exposure, and currency composition of external debt. 
 Our empirical method relies upon a two-step approach. We first investigate the extent of 
sensitivity of policy interest rate, the real effective exchange rate (REER) and several other 
macro variables to those of the center economies while controlling for global factors.  The 
estimation is done for the sample period is 1986 through 2015, using monthly data and in a 
rolling fashion. Next, we examine the association of these sensitivity coefficients with country’s 
trilemma choices, the real and financial linkages with the CE, the levels of institutional 
development, balance sheet exposure, and the like.  Using the methodology of Frankel and Wei 
(1996), we estimate the currency weights of the non-ECs economies, and study the impact of 
these weights on the transmission of shocks from the ECs to non-ECs countries (or peripheral 
economies, “PHs”).  
We find that for both policy interest rates and the REER, the link with the CEs has been a 
dominant factor for developing and emerging market economies [EMGs] in the last two decades. 
Furthermore, the developing and EMGs policy interest rates are more sensitive to global 
financial shocks around the time of EMGs’ crises in the period surrounding the turn of the 
century, and again since the Global Financial Crisis [GFC] of 2008.  In contrast with Rey’s 
conclusions, we find that the type of exchange rate regime and country’s currency weights or 
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currency composition in international debt do matter: developing countries or EMGs with more 
stable exchange rate and more open financial markets are more affected by changes in the policy 
interest rates in the CEs. Exchange rate stability, financial openness, and IR holding are jointly 
significant for the group of developing or emerging market countries.  
Distinct from our earlier results, we find evidence that the weights of major currencies, 
the extent of external debt, and the currency composition of debt are significant factors. Having a 
higher weight of the dollar (or the euro) enhances the responsiveness of a financial variable such 
as PH REER and EMP to a change in key variables in the U.S. (or the euro area). While having 
more exposure to external debt has similar effects on the financial linkages between the CEs and 
the PHs, the currency composition of international debt securities has a differential impact. 
Those economies more reliant on the dollar for debt issuance tend to be more vulnerable to 
shocks occurring in the U.S. 
In what follows, we present the framework of our main empirical analysis in Section 2. 
Each of the two steps for the estimation is explained in this section. In Section 3, we present 
empirical results for the baseline estimations. In Section 4, we focus on the impacts of currency 
weights, trade with currency zones, external debt, and currency composition of international 
debt. We make concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
 
2 The Framework of the Main Empirical Analysis 
Methodologically, we extend the same approach as followed in Aizenman et al. (2016), 
with special focus on different determinants of linkage strength between the CEs and the PHs. To 
recap, our analytical process is similar to the two-step estimations employed by Forbes and 
Chinn (2004). As the first step, we focus on the five possible linkages between the PHs and the 
CEs and investigate the degree of the sensitivity through those linkages. For each of the five 
linkages, we regress a financial variable of the PHs on another (or the same) variable of the CEs 
while controlling for global factors. In the second step, we treat the estimated degree of 
sensitivity as the dependent variable, and examine their determinants among a number of 
country-specific variables, including the roles of countries’ macroeconomic conditions or 
policies, real or financial linkage with the center economy, or the level of institutional 
development of the countries. In this study, our discussion centers on the effect of variables 
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pertaining to balance sheets of the sample countries such as external debt, the weights of major 
currencies in the currency basket, and the share of currencies for debt denomination. 
 
2.1 The Five Linkages – The Channels through which PHs are Susceptible to Changes in 
CEs’ Financial Conditions 
Before we investigate the linkages between the CEs and the PHs, we must identify what 
kind of linkages we focus on. In that regard, Figure 1 is helpful. It illustrates how the variables of 
our focus tend to be more affected by spillovers of shocks around the globe. More specifically, 
the five linkages between the CEs and the PHs are as follows. 
Link 1 – Short-term, policy interest rate in the CEs  Short-term, policy interest rate in 
the PHs: If country i has its monetary policy more susceptible to the monetary policy of one (or 
more) of the CEs, the correlation of the policy interest rates between the CEs and PHs should be 
significantly positive, implying a closer linkage between the CEs and PHs. However, a 
significantly negative correlation could also mean a closer linkage. If a rise in a CE’s policy rate 
could draw capital from the PHs, that could reduce money demand among PHs and therefore 
lower the policy rates among them while the CEs experience a rise in both money demand and 
the policy rate, thus making the correlation negative.4 
Link 2 – Short-term, policy interest rate in the CEs  REER in the PHs: A rise in the 
short-term interest rate in the CEs could be followed by a rise in PH’s REER (i.e., real 
appreciation) if PHs pursue more stable exchange rate movements against the currencies of the 
CEs. If not, a rise in the short-term interest rate in the CEs could draw more capital from PHs, 
pushing down their REER. 
Link 3 – REER in the CEs   REER in the PHs: As was in the previous case, real 
appreciation (depreciation) of CEs’ currencies can be followed by real appreciation 
(depreciation) of PHs’ currencies, making the correlation positive, which is more likely if PHs 
pursue greater exchange rate stability. Or, highly indebted PHs may also try to have their REER 
                                                          
4 In other words, if a rise (fall) of the short-term interest rates in the CEs is followed by a fall (rise) in the money 
growth (or supply) of the PHs, the correlation of the interest rates between the CEs and PHs will be positive. If a rise 
(fall) in the CEs’ interest rates is followed by a fall (rise) in money demand among PHs (i.e., a fall in the policy 
rate), the correlation would be negative. The latter could more likely happen if PHs have more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements as we will see later on. 
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to follow that of the CEs if their debt is denominated in the currencies of the CEs to prevent debt 
burden in their domestic currencies from rising. 
Link 4 – Change in REER in CEs  the Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) in PHs: 
When the CE’s experience real appreciation of their currencies, given some price stickiness, that 
would create (expected) nominal depreciation pressure on a peripheral economy, raising the 
expected rate of return from holding CE’s assets in terms of PH’s currency. If the PHs does not 
pursue exchange rate fixity, its currency would depreciate. If it does pursue exchange rate fixity, 
then the PH’s monetary authorities would intervene the foreign exchange market, decrease its 
holding of foreign reserves, and end up having a higher policy interest rate. Given that the EMP 
index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the rate of depreciation, the 
percentage loss in international reserves, and the change in the nominal interest rate, whether 
PH’s monetary authorities pursue exchange rate fixity (i.e., no currency depreciation but a rise in 
the interest rate and a reduction in IR holding) or not (i.e., currency depreciation with no or less 
change in the interest rate or IR holding), its EMP should rise. Hence, the CE’s REER should be 
positively correlated with the non-center’s EMP. 
Link 5 – REER in CEs  Stock market prices in PHs: In 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve 
hinted at the eventual taper in its purchases of long term Treasury’s and agency bonds (i.e., 
quantitative easing (QE)); that created downward pressure for some emerging market 
economies’ currencies, and subsequent downturns in their respective equity markets. This “taper 
tantrum” episode and market jitters in the “Fragile Five” (i.e., Brazil, India, Indonesia, South 
Africa, and Turkey) constitutes the prime example of how a rise in the exchange rates of the CEs 
can lead to a fall in stock market prices of the PHs.  Besides this kind of portfolio effect, it can be 
anticipated that currency appreciation of the CEs creates expected currency depreciation for the 
PHs, and if the PH of concern is more often to international trade, currency depreciation would 
give exporters more trade competitiveness, so that stock market prices could rise, reflecting a rise 
in future income flows of the firms in the PH. 
We estimate the five linkages with or sensitivity to the CEs’ financial conditions by 
applying the same methodology as we employed in Aizenman et al. (2016).5 
 
 
                                                          
5 Links 1 and 3 are already investigated in Aizenman, et al. (2015).  
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2.2 The First-Step: Estimating Sensitivity Coefficients 
The main objective of this first step estimation is to estimate the correlation between a 
financial variable of the CEs and another (or the same) financial variable of peripheral economy 
i, while controlling for global factors. We focus on the estimated coefficient C
Fi̂ which represents 
the extent of sensitivity of the financial variable 
itY of country i to another (or the same) 
financial variable ( C
itX ) of each of the three CEs, i.e., the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan, as 














FitFitit XZY   
 11
,    (1) 
 
where G
iZ is a vector of global factors, and 
C
iX is a vector of cross-country factors.  
We estimate C
it for the five linkages as we discussed in the previous subsection, using 
the following variables. 
 
Table 1: Five Linkages and Corresponding Financial Variables (also see Figure 1) 
Link Financial Variable in the CEs (XC)7 Financial Variable in the PHs (Y) 
Link 1 Money market rate Money market rate 
Link 2 Change in money market rate Change in REER 
Link 3 Change in REER Change in REER 
Link 4 Change in REER Exchange market pressure (EMP) 
Link 5 Change in REER Change in stock market prices 
 
For money market rates that represent policy short-term interest rate, using official policy 
interest rates may not capture the actual state of monetary policy because all of the CEs have 
                                                          
6 We do not include China as one of the CEs. Aizenman, et al. (2015) find that despite the recent impressive rise as 
an economic power, China’s contribution in the financial sector still seems negligible in a historical context. 
Considering that the Shanghai stock market crash in the summer of 2015 and the winter of 2016 significantly 
affected financial markets in the U.S., Japan, and Europe, one expects that the role of China as a CE and 
connectivity with it will become substantial in the near future. The same kind of argument can be made about 
whether other large emerging market economies such as Brazil, Russia, and India can be the center economies that 
exert global influence. While their role as major economies in the world has been rising, we would still have to wait 
for future research to identify their increasing influence in the global economy. 
7 For the Euro Area’s variables before the introduction of the euro in 1999, the GDP-weighted average of the 
variable of concern for the original 12 Euro countries is calculated and included in the estimation.  
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implemented extremely loose monetary policy, whether conventional or unconventional one, in 
the aftermath of the GFC.8 Hence, we use the “shadow interest rates” to represent a more 
realistic state of liquidity availability for the three advanced economies. For the U.S. and the 
Euro area, we use the shadow interest rates estimated by Wu and Xia (2014). For Japan, we use 
the shadow rates estimated by Christensen and Rudebusch (2014).  
For the stock market price indices as well as the REER, we use data from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Also, we calculate the EMP index, using the data for 
policy interest rates, nominal exchange rates, and international reserves from the IFS. For more 
details on the EMP, refer to Data Appendix.  
We also have global factors ( G
iZ ) as a group of control variables in the estimation. The 
vector of “real” variables includes global interest rates (for which we use the first principal 
component of U.S. Federal Reserve, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s policy interest rates); oil prices; 
and commodity prices.9 G
iZ also comprises another vector of “financial” global factors, namely, 
the VIX index from the Chicago Board Options Exchange as a proxy for the extent of investors’ 
risk aversion as well as the “Ted spread,” which is the difference between the 3-month 
Eurodollar Deposit Rate in London (LIBOR) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill yield. The 
latter measure gauges the general level of stress in the money market for financial institutions.  
We apply the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to do the estimation for each of the 
sample countries for the five links and for about 100 countries, which include advanced 
economies (IDC), less developed countries (LDC), and emerging market countries (EMG) the 
latter of which is a subset of LDC.10 Inevitably, the sample size varies depending on data 
availability. The sample period is 1986 through 2015, using monthly data, with regressions 
implemented over non-overlapping three year periods.11 That means that we obtain time-varying 
                                                          
8 This is true especially after the ECB and the Bank of Japan lowered their policy rates down to zero but before they 
adopted negative interest rates. 
9 Whenever we include a variable for the policy interest rate, whether as a level or a change, in XC (such as the 
estimations for Links 1 and 2), we do not include the first component of U.S. FRB, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s 
interest rates as part of the global factor vector to avoid redundancy with XC. We also use the first principal 
component of oil and commodity prices – to avoid multicollinearity or redundancy – as a control variable for input 
or commodity prices. 
10 The emerging market countries (EMG) are defined as the countries classified as either emerging or frontier during 
the period of 1980-1997 by the International Financial Corporation plus Hong Kong and Singapore. 
11 The starting date for the sample period is chosen mainly based on data availability for the second-step estimation. 
Conceptually, the mid-1980s is also the time when global spillover effects became more evident after financial 




Fit̂  across the panels. For all the estimations, we exclude the U.S. and Japan. As for the Euro 
member countries, they are removed from the sample after the introduction of the euro in 
January 1999 or they become member countries, whichever comes first.12  
 
2.3 The Second Step: Baseline Model 
Once we estimate C
Fit for each of the dependent variables, we regress 
C
Fit̂  on a number of 
country-specific variables. To account for potential outliers on the dependent variable, we apply 




Fit uCRISISINSTLINKMCOMP  543210ˆ    (2) 
 
Here, the choice of variables is based on a wide variety of literature pertaining to 
spillover effects and global synchronization of financial or macroeconomic variables. Hence, we 
assume that the above estimation model takes a reduced form, rather than a structural form, by 
which we can address various theoretical predictions at once, rather than relying on one 
particular theory. 
There are four groups of explanatory variables. The first group of explanatory variables is 
a set of open macroeconomic policy choices ( iOMP ), for which we include the indexes for 
exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) from the trilemma indexes by 
Aizenman, et al. (2013). As another variable potentially closely related to the trilemma 
framework, we include the variable for IR holding (excluding gold) as a share of GDP because 
we believe the level of IR holding may affect the extent of cross-country financial linkages.14  
The group iMC  includes macroeconomic conditions such as inflation volatility, current 
account balance, and public finance conditions. As the measure of public finance conditions, we 
include gross national debt expressed as a share of GDP.  
                                                          
12 Endogeneity can be an issue for this type of estimation. As a robustness check, we re-estimated the first-step 
model by lagging the right-hand-side variables. However, it did not change the characteristics of the results (not 
reported). Hence, we keep the estimation method as it is. 
13 This estimation method keeps recursively down-weighting the outliers until it obtains converged estimates. 
14 Aizenman, et al. (2010, 2011) show the macroeconomic impact of trilemma policy configurations depends upon 
the level of IR holding. 
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In addition, we include variables that reflect the extent of linkages with the center 




ipip GDPIMPLINKTR _  where 
C
iIMP is total imports into center economy C from 
country i, that is normalized by country i’s GDP. Another linkage variable is financial linkage, 
FIN_LINKip. We measure it with the ratio of the total FDI stock and bank lending from country 
C in country i both as shares of country i’s GDP.  
Another variable that also reflects the linkage with the major economies is the variable 
for the extent of trade competition (Trade_Comp). Trade_Comp measures the importance to 
country i of export competition in the third markets between country i and major country C. 
Shocks to country C, and especially shocks to country C that affects country c’s exchange rate, 
could affect the relative price of country C’s exports and therefore affect country i through trade 
competition in third markets. See Appendix for the variable construction. A higher value of this 
measure indicates country i and major economic C exports products in similar sectors so that 
their exported products tend to be competitive to each other.  
The fourth group is composed of the variables that characterize the nature of institutional 
development (INST), namely, variables for financial development and legal development. For the 
measure of the level of financial development, we use the first principal component of financial 
development using the data on private credit creation, stock market capitalization, stock market 
total value, and private bond market capitalization all as shares of GDP. Likewise, we measure 
the level of legal development using the first principal component of law and order (LAO), 
bureaucratic quality (BQ), and anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT). Higher values of these 
variables indicate better conditions. 
To control for economic or financial disruptions, we include a vector of currency and 
banking crises (CRISIS). For currency crisis, we use a dummy variable based on the exchange 
market pressure (EMP) index which is calculated using the exchange rate against the currency of 
the base country. The banking crisis dummy is based on the papers by Laeven and Valencia 
(2008, 2010, 2012).  
The variables in MC and INST are included in the estimations as deviations from the 
U.S., Japanese, and Euro Area’s counterparts. The variables in vectors OMP, MC, and INST are 
sampled from the first year of each three year panels to minimize the effect of potential 
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endogeneity or bidirectional causality.15 Also, in order to capture global common shocks, we also 
include time fixed effects.   
 
3 Empirical Results for the Baseline Estimation 
3.1 First-Step Estimations – Connectivity with the CEs  
As the first step, we estimate the extent of correlation for each of the five financial 
linkages while controlling for two kinds of global factors: “real global” and “financial global,” 
using the three-year, non-overlapping panels in the 1986-2015 period.  
To gain a birds-eye view of the empirical results and the general trend of the groups of 
factors that influence the financial links, we focus on the joint significance of the variables 
included in the real global and financial global groups, and vector XC the latter of which includes 
the financial variables of the CEs for each of the five potential financial links (Table 1 and 
Figure 1).  
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of countries for which the joint significance tests are 
found to be statistically significant (with the p-value less than 5%) for the real global and 
financial global groups, and vector XC for the five financial links. While we present the 
proportion for the groups of advanced economies (IDC) and less developed economies (LDC) 
after 1992, our discussions focuses on the results of developing countries.16  
The graphical depictions in Figure 2 lead to the following conclusions. First, the 
influence of the CEs is the greatest for the policy interest rates and the real effective exchange 
rates. That is, the policy interest rates and the REER of the CEs affect most joint-significantly 
those of the PHs, respectively. This is consistent with the findings reported in Aizenman et al. 
(2016). 
Second, the REER of the CEs significantly affects the stock market price changes of the 
PHs during and after the GFC of 2008, though the impact dwindles toward the end of the sample 
period. This and previous findings are consistent with the reactions expressed by emerging 
                                                          
15 Sampling data from the first year of each three-year panel could still entail bidirectional causality. As another way 
of mitigating endogeneity or bidirectional causality, we could lag the right-hand-side variables, but by one three-
year panel. Lagging the right-hand-side variables this way could mean that we assume it takes three to five years for 
the right-hand-side variables to affect the dependent variable, which we do not think is plausible. 
16 We also conduct the same exercise for the subgroup of EMGs. The figures for the EMG group are usually 
qualitatively similar to those of the LDC group. Hence, we omit discussing them here. 
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market policy makers – especially those in “Fragile Five” – to the taper in Fed quantitative 
easing and the Federal Fund rate increase in December 2015.  
Third, the policy interest rates of the CEs do not affect the REER of many PHs. Even 
during the GFC and its immediate aftermath, the proportion of the countries for which the policy 
interest rates of the CEs are jointly significant is about 20%. A similar observation can be made 
for the REER-EMP link. 
Fourth, as far as the policy interest rate link between the CEs and the PHs (Link 1) is 
concerned, the proportion of joint significance is also relatively high for the group of “financial 
global” variables during the GFC and the last three year panel for developing countries and since 
the GFC for developed countries and emerging market countries, suggesting global financial 
factors have been playing an important role in affecting the policy interest of countries regardless 
of income levels. This result is consistent with the Rey’s (2013) thesis of “global financial 
cycles.” Not surprisingly, economies are more exposed to global financial shocks during periods 
of financial turbulence while also following CEs’ monetary policies. 
Figure 3 disaggregates the effect of the CEs. The bars illustrate the proportion of the 
countries with significant 𝛾’s for the three CEs: the United States, the euro area, and Japan. We 
see the U.S. financial variables exerting the most significant effects on the financial variables of 
the PHs for the policy interest rate link and the REER link in most of the time period, and for the 
REER-stock market price link during the GFC years. For the policy interest rate and the REER 
links, we see the euro area affecting the financial variables of the PHs as well.  
 
3.2 Results of the Second-Step Estimation 
Now, we investigate the determinants of the extent of linkages, C
Fit̂ , using the estimation 
model based on equation (2). Table 2 reports the estimation results for the five linkages for the 
LDC and EMG samples. The bottom rows of the tables also report the joint significance tests for 
each vector of explanatory variables. 
We begin by discussing the results for the open macro policy arrangements, namely, 
exchange rate stability, financial openness, and IR holding. While PHs with more open financial 
markets tend to follow the monetary policy of the CEs, the extent of exchange rate stability they 
pursue does not matter (columns 1 and 2). Aizenman et al. (2016) found a significantly positive 
12 
 
estimate for the exchange rate variable, but our estimates are also positive but not statistically 
significant.17  
The more stable a PH country’s exchange rate movements are, the more sensitive its 
REER to the CEs’ policy interest rates or REER (columns 3-6). These results make sense; PHs 
preferring more exchange rate stability follow the CEs’ monetary policy or real appreciation of 
the CEs’ currencies, which is what we have observed among emerging market economies in 
2013-15.  
Interestingly, higher levels of IR holding would make it easier for both developing and 
emerging market countries to follow the currency real appreciation of the CEs, though there is a 
possibility this correlation is capturing reverse causality. Also, not surprisingly, PHs with more 
open financial markets tend to guide their REER to follow that of the CEs, though the estimate is 
marginally significant. Such an observation cannot be made for the EMG group (columns 5 and 
6).  
When the CEs experience real appreciation, the more exchange rate stability a PH 
pursues, the less pressure it faces on its EMP (columns 7 and 8). At the same time, if the PH has 
more open financial markets, it would face less pressure on its EMP when the CEs’ currencies 
are appreciating in real terms. The interpretation of this result is difficult; it could be that more 
open financial markets are associated with more developed financial markets, that are more 
robust to shocks emanating from abroad. Alternatively, countries that are subject to shocks tend 
to implement capital controls. 
Open macro policies do not seem to matter for the link between the CEs’ REER and the 
PHs’ stock market price movements (columns 9 and 10). The F-test for the joint significance for 
the open macro variables is far from significant. Instead, the groups of macroeconomic 
conditions and institutional characteristics are found to be jointly significant. Interestingly, PHs 
with higher debt levels or higher levels of inflation volatility tend to have their stock market 
prices falling when the CEs experience currency real appreciation. We infer that weak 
macroeconomic conditions lead to capital flight once the CEs experience real appreciation, 
which in turn leads equity market declines. The negative estimate on the current account variable 
                                                          
17 We do not include the growth rate of industrial production in the first-step estimation to maximize the sample size 
of the gammas. This, along with the extended sample period, may explain the different estimation results for the 
exchange rate stability index. 
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indicates that while PHs running current account deficit tend to experience real depreciation 
when the CEs’ currencies appreciate in real terms, weaker currencies of PHs could allow their 
firms to experience a rise in their income flows, pushing up the stock market prices in those 
economies.  
 
4.  Impacts of Currency Weights and External Debt 
In addition to the baseline model, we investigate the impact of other factors, especially 
those which are related to the balance sheets of the countries. The first factor we investigate is 
the extent of belonging to the dollar or euro zone. Clearly, the United States was the epicenter of 
the GFC. That means that countries that are dollar-oriented or dollar centric in their trade of 
goods and services as well as financial assets must have been more exposed to shocks arising 
from the U.S. We can make a similar argument about the extent of belonging to the euro zone 
especially since the euro area experienced the debt crisis in the 2010s. 
The other factor, closely linked with the previous factor, is how exposed countries are in 
terms of being indebted externally. Highly indebted countries can be more susceptible to external 
shocks, especially if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies. We also investigate the 
interactive effects of external debt exposure and the extent of reliance on the major currencies for 
debt denomination. 
This is a timely question. For the last two decades, the extent of “original sin” – the 
inability of developing countries to issue debt in their domestic currencies in international 
markets – has been perceived to be declining.18  That stands in contrast to the situation during 
emerging market crises of the 1980s through early 2000’s, when all external debt was essentially 
foreign currency denominated debt. In such cases, cross border asset-liability currency 
mismatches combined with large cross-border holdings meant that currency depreciations could 




                                                          
18 See Hausmann and Panizza (2011), who argue that the decline in the extent of original sin has been only anecdotal 
by showing that the decline in original sin has been modest if any. Ito and Rodriguez (2015) also show that the 




4.1 Impacts of Currency Weights and Trade with Currency Zones 
4.1.1 Model Framework 
We now investigate the impact of the extent of belonging to a major currency zone. 
When PHs’ monetary policy makers make decisions, they almost inevitably incorporate the 
monetary policy of the issuer of a major currency which they reference to, or they refer to an 
implicit, or de facto, currency basket composed of several major currencies. Hence, once a shock 
arises in a CE, reactions by the PHs could be affected by the composition of the major currencies 
in the currency basket. That is, the degree of sensitivity among the PHs to the policies and 
economic conditions of the CEs can depend upon the weights of the currencies in the basket. In 
the analysis below, when, say, the dollar has the highest weight in the basket, we regard the 
economy of concern as dollar-oriented or belonging to the dollar zone. The currency weights can 
be independent of the degree of exchange rate stability a country pursues.  
Using the widely-used method developed by Haldane and Hall (1991) and popularized by 
Frankel and Wei (1996), we estimate the weights of the dollar, the euro (or the German deutsche 
mark and the French franc before the introduction of the euro in 1999), the yen, and the British 
sterling with a rolling window of 36 months.19  
With the estimated weights, we can test whether and to what extent the weights of 
currencies in the basket affect the extent of connectivity between the CEs and the PHs (i.e., 𝛾’s ) 
using the following model: 
 

























where C refers to the CEs: the U.S., the Euro area, and Japan and F to the five financial linkages. 
CZWUS, Euro is the estimated weights for the dollar and the euro. 𝐷Γ represents the dummies for 
𝛾𝑈𝑆and 𝛾𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜.20   
                                                          
19 The basic assumption of this exercise is that monetary authorities use an implicit or hypothetical basket of 
currencies as the portfolio of official foreign exchange reserves, but that the extent of response to the change in the 
value of the entire basket should vary over time and across countries. If the authorities want to maintain a certain 
level of exchange rate stability, whether against a single currency or a basket of several currencies, they should 
allow the currency value to adjust only in accordance with the change in the entire value of the basket of major 
currencies. The examples of the application of this method can be found in Frankel and Wei (1996) among many 
others. 
20 Keep in mind that we have 𝛾𝑈𝑆,  𝛾𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜, and 𝛾𝐽𝑃for country i in year t as the dependent variable. 
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We focus on 𝜃7, which includes the interaction term between the dummy for 𝛾
𝑈𝑆and the 
currency zone weight for the dollar (CZWUS) and the one between the dummy for 𝛾𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 and the 
currency zone weight for the euro (CZWEuro).  
If the extent of belonging to a currency zone matters, 𝜃7 must be statistically significant. 
Because we have the two dummies for 𝛾𝑈𝑆and 𝛾𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜, the sensitivity to a shock in Japan is 
treated as the baseline. Hence,  𝜃6 represents how the dollar or euro currency weight affects the 
degree of sensitivity to a shock originating in Japan. 
Hence, for example, if Korea has a high dollar zone weight, the degree of sensitivity to a 
financial shock arising from the U.S. (𝛾𝑈𝑆) should be higher if the dollar zone weight (CZWUS) is 
higher.  Likewise, the impact of the euro weight can be found in 𝜃7. Also, the dollar or euro zone 
weight (CZWUS or Euro) should matter less to the shocks occurring in Japan (𝜃6).21 
One merit of having estimated currency weights for our sample countries is that, using 
the estimated currency weights, we can divide the currency zones’ partners of each non-major 
currency economy into five currency zones.22 To do so, every non-G5 economy is divided into 
G5-currency zones, based on the estimated G5-currency weights, i.e.,
iht̂ , for the economy. For 
example, if Thailand has a currency basket, with the USD weight of a%, the DM weight of b%, 
the FF weight of c%, the BP weight of d%, and the yen weight of e%, then we assume that a% of 
Thailand’s economy belongs to the USD zone, b% to the DM zone, c% to the FF zone, d% to the 
UKP zone, and e% to the yen zone. All other non-G5 economies are similarly divided into G5 
currency zones. On the other hand, each of the G5 countries is assumed to constitute its own 
currency zone. Then, the trade share of a non-G5 economy (say India) with countries belonging 
to a major-currency zone can be calculated first by multiplying
iht̂ with bilateral trade with each 
partner (say Thailand, while bilateral trade between India and Thailand is defined as the sum of 
bilateral exports and imports), and then by summing up all the products over all the bilateral 
                                                          
21 That means 𝜽6 should have the opposite sign to 𝜽7 or be insignificant. 
22 The choice of the G5 countries is based on the currencies represented by the SDR basket during the sample 
period, see https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx.  
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trade pairs. The ratio of this sum to the economy’s (India’s) total trade is regarded as its trade 
share with one of the “major-currency zones.”23 
Now, we include the share of trade with respect to the dollar and the euro zones instead 
of the dollar and the euro zone weights as follows: 
 

























Like in the previous case, if the shares of trade with countries in the dollar zone or those 
in the euro zone matter, 𝜃7̂ should be statistically significant, and 𝜃6 would capture the impact of 
trade with the dollar or euro zone countries on the sensitivity to a financial shock arising from 
Japan.24  
 
4.1.2 Estimation Results 
Table 3 reports the results for each of the five link regressions. To conserve space, we 
only report the estimates for the open macro variables and the variables pertaining to currency 
weights.  
Although the extent of belonging to the dollar zone does not matter for the link between 
the CEs’ policy interest rates and the PHs’ REER (Link 2), it does matter for the link between 
the CEs’ REER and the PHs’ REER (Link 3). If the U.S. experiences a positive (i.e., 
appreciation) shock to its REER, developing countries with higher USD weights tend to 
experience REER appreciation, which also applies to the EMGs. The euro weights are always 
positive factors for both subgroups. We can also see for both subgroups, the variable for 
exchange rate stability is found to be a significantly positive factor. With these results, we see 
that both developing and emerging market countries with higher weights of major currencies in 
their baskets tend to have the “fear of floating.” These countries are also affected by greater 
financial openness and IR holding as well. 
                                                          











_  where j is i’s trading 




24 To avoid redundancy, the variable for trade demand by the CEs is removed. 
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U.S. REER appreciation would lead to an increase in EMP (Link 4) for both LDCs and 
EMGs if they have higher dollar zone weights, and more euro-oriented economies tend to have 
smaller or more negative impacts. 
U.S. REER appreciation would cause declines in stock markets in LDCs and EMGs if 
their dollar zone weights are higher (Link 5), suggesting that U.S. REER appreciation may cause 
capital flight from dollar-oriented countries.  
When we include the share of trade with respect to the dollar and the euro zones, 
generally, the estimation results for these variables remain intact qualitatively but usually with 
stronger statistical significance. Obtaining essentially consistent results indicate that both 
currency weights and the share of trade with the dollar and euro zones matter for the extent of 
spillover linkages to the CEs. 
 
4.2 Impacts of External Debt 
We shift our attention to the impact of other balance sheet factors on the extent of 
susceptibility to shocks occurring in the CEs. In particular, external debt is our focus since it has 
long argued that it increases the level of risk exposure.  
We examine the impacts of the following variables. 
 External debt as a share of exports 
 External debt as a share of GNI 
 Short-term debt as a share of exports 
 Short-term debt as a share of total external debt 
 Short-term debt as a share of IR 
 
We report the results for the five links’ estimations in Table 4. The results for Link 1: 
policy interest rate link between the CEs and the PHs show that this link is not affected by how 
much PHs owe externally. The estimate for the size of (outstanding) international debt securities 
is positive, but it is not statistically significant.  
However, the link between the CEs’ policy interest rates and PHs’ REER (Link 2) is 
affected by the size of external debt. The estimate for international debt (as a share of GNI) and 
the one for external debt (as a share of exports) are significantly negative for the EMG countries. 
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The results indicate that, for example, a rise in the U.S. policy interest rate would lead more 
toward currency real depreciation of a PH if its total external debt is larger. 
Such a negative impact of external debt is also observed when we focus on the REER link 
between the CEs and the PHs (Link 3). The estimate on the variable for external debt (as a share 
of GNI) is significantly negative among the EMGs. For the LDC group, not just external debt (as 
a share of GNI) but also short-term debt (as a share of exports) are found to be negative 
contributors to the REER link. These findings suggest that developing or emerging market 
countries would find it harder to pursue exchange rate stability against the CEs’ currencies when 
they are loaded with external debt.  
Greater levels of external debt or short-term debt would also make PHs’ EMP more 
positively correlated with CE’s REER especially among emerging market countries (Link 4). 
These results suggest that if the CEs experience real currency appreciation, that would draw 
capital flows from emerging market countries, thereby creating upward pressure on the EMP, 
explaining why emerging market crises often unhappy when the CEs -- particularly the U.S. -- 
implement contractionary monetary policy. 
The link between the CEs’ REER change and the PHs’ stock market price changes 
become more negative when the PHs are more indebted short-term. Consistent with the previous 
case, CEs’ real currency appreciation would cause capital outflows from emerging market 
countries, which would cause their stock market prices to fall. Again, being indebted short-term 
increases the risk of negative spillover effects from the CEs. 
 
4.3 Impacts of Currency Composition of Debt 
We turn now examining how the composition of external debt, holding constant the level 
of debt, affects the linkages. For instance, if a peripheral economy has more dollar-denominated 
debt, such an economy should be more vulnerable to spillover effects from the U.S., more so 
than to spillovers from other CEs. Hence, the currency composition of the debt is important.  
As has been widely evidenced, many economies are reliant on the dollar or other hard 
currencies to issue international debt. However, such reliance would entail intrinsic instability 
because currency depreciation would increase the debt burden in terms of the domestic currency 
and cause currency mismatch. If a peripheral country issues a large portion of its international 
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debt in the dollar while pegging its currency to the dollar, expected depreciation would cause a 
self-fulfilling twin (i.e., currency and debt) crisis. 
Hence, we take a look at the impact of currency compositions in international debt 
denomination, focusing the share of dollar-denominated debt. For that, we use the following 
specification.  
 






















where CSHUS is the share of the dollar in a certain variable for debt, namely, either public and 
publicly guaranteed debt or international debt securities. More specifically, we test the following 
six variables for the share of the dollar in debt denomination: 
 
 Dollar-denominated International debt (%) = share of the dollar-denomination in 
total international debt securities, Extracted from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) Debt Securities Statistics.  
 Public debt denominated in the dollar (%) = share of dollar-denominated external 
long-term public and publicly-guaranteed debt in total PPG. Extracted from the 
World Bank’s Global Development Indicators. 
 Dollar-denominated International debt (%) – financial Institution = share of the 
dollar-denomination in total international debt securities issued by financial 
institutions.  
 Dollar-denominated International debt (%) – non-financial Institution = share of the 
dollar-denomination in total international debt securities issued by non-financial 
corporations, BIS 
 Dollar-denominated International debt (%) – government sector = share of the 
dollar-denomination in total international debt securities issued by government 
sector, BIS 
 
We include these variables as both individually and interactively with the dummy for the 
correlation with the U.S. (𝛾𝑈𝑆) as we did with the currency weights variables or the variables for 
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the share of trade with the dollar and the euro.  Likewise, the estimate of our focus is 𝜃7, which is 
supposed to capture whether and to what extent the share of the dollar in debt affects the 
spillover effects arising from the U.S. Since we only focus on the effect of the dollar, 𝜃6 would 
capture the effect on the share of the dollar in debt denomination on the spillover effects from the 
euro area or Japan.  
We report the estimation results in Table 5. In the section for Link 1, the policy interest 
rate link, we see that for both the LDC and EMG groups, the estimated extent of linkage is 
weaker or more negative if the share of the dollar in international debt securities issued by 
financial institute is higher. This result is consistent with the result we obtained when examining 
the impact of the dollar weight. Considering that the dollar share in international debt and the 
dollar weight in the currency basket are correlated (McCauley and Chen, 2015; Ito, McCauley, 
and Chen, 2015), this finding is unsurprising. 
The higher dollar share in international debt securities a PH has, the more positively 
correlated its REER to a policy interest rate change in the U.S. (Link 2). However, that applies 
only to the dollar share in international debt securities issued by the government sector of the 
PH, and the estimates are not statistically significant. One possible explanation is that the PH 
would fear fluctuations in its exchange rate against the dollar if it has more government debt 
denominated in the dollar (“fear of floating”).  
Such fear of floating is more clearly evidenced in the REER-REER link (Link 3), 
whether the debt is issued by financial institution, non-financial institution, or government 
sector. The estimates of the interactions terms between the U.S. gamma and the dollar share in 
the three types of international debt are all significantly positive for the LDC sample. Simply, if 
PH’s international debt is more denominated in the dollar, the PH would try to align its REER 
with that of the U.S. In fact, it is not just for international debt securities, the dollar share in 
public and publicly guaranteed debt also makes the PH’s REER more sensitive to the U.S. 
REER. 
Given the above result for Link 3, it is not surprising that we also find similar results for 
the link between PHs’ EMP and the U.S. REER (Link 4). If the U.S. experiences currency real 
appreciation, the PHs’ EMP would be more responsive if the dollar share is higher in the 
denomination for international debt issued by either financial or non-financial institutions, or for 
public and publicly guaranteed debt. 
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PHs with more dollar-denominated international debt or public debt also tend to respond 
to a change in the U.S. REER more negatively (Link 5). As it happened at the time of the “taper 
tantrum,” a rise in the U.S. REER leads to stock market price declines among the PHs with 
dollar-denominated international debt or public debt. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Since the U.S. started winding down its unconventional monetary policy in 2013, 
emerging market policymakers have anxiously awaited the direction of monetary policy 
conducted by advanced economy monetary authorities, especially the Fed. Such concerns 
intensified when the Fed terminated its zero interest rate policy in December 2015. In 
increasingly integrated global financial markets, connectivity between the center economies and 
the peripheral economies has become tighter, increasing the speed and intensity of transmission 
and spillover of monetary, financial and policy shocks. This environment has created more 
challenges for the policy makers in non-center economies, and indeed has prompted a re-think of 
the role of monetary policy and the trilemma hypothesis. 
This paper investigates the questions of whether and how the financial conditions of 
developing and emerging market countries are affected by the movements of financial variables 
in the center economies (the U.S., Japan, and the Euro area). Our empirical method relies upon a 
two-step approach. We first investigate the extent of connectivity for the five linkages between a 
financial variable of the CEs and another (or the same) financial variable of the PHs while 
controlling for global and domestic factors. In the second step, we treat these estimated 
sensitivities as dependent variables, and relate them to a number of country-specific 
macroeconomic conditions or policies, real or financial linkages, and the levels of institutional 
development. Among these variables, we focus on the impact of balance sheet-related factors, 
namely, the weights of major currencies, external debt, and currency compositions of debt. 
From the first-step estimation, we find that for both policy interest rates and the REER, 
the link with the CEs has been dominant for developing and emerging market economies in the 
last two decades. At the same time, the movements of policy interest rates are found to be more 
sensitive to global financial shocks around the time of the emerging markets’ crises in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and since the time of the GFC of 2008.  
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In the second-step estimation, we generally find evidence that the weights of major 
currencies, external debt, and currency compositions of debt affect the degree of connectivity. 
We summarize our findings in Table 6.  
More specifically, having a higher weight of the dollar or the euro in the implicit 
currency basket would make the response of a financial variable such as REER and EMP in the 
PHs more sensitive to a change in key variables in the CEs such as policy interest rates and 
REER. Having more exposure to external debt would have similar impacts on the financial 
linkages between the CEs and the PHs. Lastly, we find that currency composition in international 
debt securities matter. Generally, those economies more reliant on the dollar for debt issuance 
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Appendix: Data Descriptions and Sources 
 
Policy short-term interest rate – money market rates Extracted from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS).  
Stock market prices – stock market price indices from the IFS 
Sovereign bond spread – the difference between the long-term interest rate (usually 10 year 
government bond) and the policy short-term interest rate – i.e., the slope of the yield curve, 
IFS.  
Real effective exchange rate (REER) – REER index from the IFS. An increase indicates 
appreciation. 
Global interest rate – the first principal component of U.S. FRB, ECB, and Bank of Japan’s 
policy interest rates. 
Commodity prices – the first principal component of oil prices and commodity prices, both from 
the IFS. 
VIX index – It is available in http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx and measures the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. 
“Ted spread” – It is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar Deposit Rate in London 
(LIBOR) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill yield. 
Industrial production  – It is based on the industrial production index from the IFS. 
Exchange rate stability (ERS) and financial openness (KAOPEN) indexes – From the trilemma 
indexes by Aizenman, et al. (2013). 
International reserves – international reserves minus gold divided by nominal GDP. The data are 
extracted from the IFS. 
Gross national debt and general budget balance – both are included as shares of GDP and 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
Trade demand by the CEs – 
ip
C
ipip GDPIMPLINKTR _  where CiIMP is total imports into center 
economy C from country i, that is normalized by country i’s GDP based on the data from the 
IMF Direction of Trade database. 
FDI provided by the CEs – It is the ratio of the total stock of foreign direct investment from 
country C in country i as a share of country i’s GDP. We use the OECD International Direct 
Investment database.  
Bank lending provided by the CEs – It is the ratio of the total bank lending provided by each of 
the CEs to country i shown as a share of country i’s GDP. We use the BIS database.  

































kWExp ,  is exports from large-country c to every other country in the world (W) in industrial 
sector k whereas W
kWExp , is exports from every country in the world to every other country in 
the world (i.e. total global exports) in industrial sector k. i
kWExp , is exports from country i to 
every other country in the world in industrial sector k, and GDPi is GDP for country i. We 
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assume merchandise exports are composed of five industrial sectors (K), that is, 
manufacturing, agricultural products, metals, fuel, and food. 
This index is normalized using the maximum value of the product in parentheses for every 
country pair in the sample. Thus, it ranges between zero and one.25 A higher value of this 
variable means that country i’s has more comparable trade structure to the center economies. 
Financial development – It is the first principal component of private credit creation, stock 
market capitalization, stock market total value, and private bond market capitalization all as 
shares of GDP.26 
Legal development – It is the first principal component of law and order (LAO), bureaucratic 
quality (BQ), and anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT), all from the ICRG database. Higher 
values of these variables indicate better conditions. 
Currency crisis – It is from Aizenman and Ito (2014) who use the exchange market pressure 
(EMP) index using the exchange rate against the currency of the base country. We use two 
standard deviations of the EMP as the threshold to identify a currency crisis. 
Banking crisis – It is from Aizenman and Ito (2014) who follow the methodology of Laeven and 
Valencia (2008, 2010, 2012). For more details, see Appendix 1 of Aizenman and Ito (2014). 
Exchange market pressure (EMP) index –It is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes 
in the nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal 
interest rate. The nominal exchange rate is calculated against the base country that we use to 
construct the trilemma indexes (see Aizenman, et al., 2008). The weights are inversely 
related to each country’s standard deviations of each of the changes in the three components 
over the sample countries.  






















































b stands for the “base country,” which is defined as the country that a home country’s 
monetary policy is most closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004) and Aizenman, et al. 
(2013). The base countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South 
Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. The base country can change as it has happened to Ireland, for 
example. Its base country was the U.K. until the mid-1970s, and changed to Germany since 
Ireland joined the European Monetary System (EMS).  
To construct the crisis dummies in three-year panels, we assign the value of one if a crisis 
occurs in any year within the three-year period. 
Share of export/import – The share of country i’s export to, or import from, a major currency 
country (e.g., Japan) in country i’s total export or import. The data are taken from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade. 
                                                          
25 This variable is an aggregated version of the trade competitiveness variable in Forbes and Chinn (2004). Their 
index is based on more disaggregated 14 industrial sectors. 
26 Because the private bond market capitalization data go back only to 1990, the FD series before 1990 are 
extrapolated using the principal component of private credit creation, stock market capitalization, and stock market 
total values, which goes back to 1976. These two FD measures are highly correlated with each other. 
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Commodity export/import as a percentage of total export/import – Data are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. 











it eeeee   .   
Here, eit is the nominal exchange rate of home currency i , against the dollar (USD), yen (JP), 
pound (UKP), Deutsche mark (DM), and French franc (FF). The major currencies in the 
right-hand side of the estimation equation can be thought of comprising an implicit currency 
basket in the mind of the home economy’s policymaker. Therefore,
ih̂ , the estimated 
coefficient on the rate of change in the exchange rate of major currency h vis-à-vis the U.S. 
dollar, represents the weight of currency h in the implicit basket. The weight of the dollar 
can be calculated as  iFFtiDMtiBPtiJYtiUSt  ˆˆˆˆ1ˆ  .27 We apply the estimation model 
to each of our sample currencies, but estimate it over rolling windows of 36 months. Hence, 
the coefficients
ih̂ ’s are time-varying in monthly frequency to reflect the assumption that 
policymakers keep updating their information sets and, thus, currency weights. This rolling 
regression is not run for the G5 currencies, but their currency weights are set at the value of 
one, that is, each of the G5 countries is assumed to constitute its own currency zone without 
depending on other major-currency exchange rates. For the estimations, we use monthly 
data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Outliers observed for the estimated 
 ˆiht due to financial or macroeconomic turbulences are deleted on a monthly basis. Any 
significantly negative  ˆiht is assumed to be a missing estimate and a statistically 
insignificant negative  ˆiht is replaced with a value of zero. Likewise, any  
ˆ
iht that is 
significantly no greater from the value of one is replaced with the value of one, while  ˆiht
significantly greater than one is replaced with a missing variable. Once outliers are removed 
and some estimates are replaced with other valued on a monthly basis, they are annually 
averaged to create annual data series. 
Trade share with respect to each currency zone (TSH_CZ) – Using the estimated currency 
weights, we first divide the trade partners of each non-major currency economy into five 
currency zones. Each of major currency countries is assumed to constitute its own currency 
zone. Then, the trade share of a non-G5 economy (say India) with countries belonging to a 
major-currency zone can be calculated first by multiplying
iht̂ with bilateral trade with each 
partner (say Thailand, so bilateral trade between India and Thailand is defined as the sum of 
bilateral exports and imports), and then by summing up all the products over all the bilateral 
trade pairs. The ratio of this sum to the economy’s (India’s) total trade is regarded as its trade 
share with one of the “major-currency zones.” 
Foreign currency-denominated international debt (% of GNI) – International debt securities 
denominated in any currency than the domestic currency (of the issuer), normalized by Gross 
National Income. The external debt data are extracted from the BIS International Debt 
                                                          






h  . For 
an economy with its currency pegged to the DM, 1ˆ iDMt . 
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Security Database (IDSD), and GNI is from the World Bank’s Global Development 
Indicators (GDI).  
External debt as a share of total exports; External debt as a share of GNI; Short-term debt as a 
ratio to total exports; Short-term debt as a ratio to total external debt; Short-term debt as a 
ratio to total IR holdings – All these data are extracted from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Indicators. 
Dollar-denominated international debt (%) – International debt securities denominated in the US 
dollar as a share of total international debt securities. BIS-IDSD.  
Public debt denominated in U.S. dollar (%) – The share of external long-term public and 
publicly-guaranteed (PPG) debt contracted in the dollar in total long-term public and 
publicly-guaranteed debt. Data are from WDI. 
 Dollar-denominated international debt (%): Financial institutions – The share of the dollar-
denominated international debt securities in total international debt securities issued by 
financial institutions, BIS-IDSD 
Dollar-denominated international debt(%): Non-financial institutions – The share of the dollar-
denominated international debt securities in total international debt securities issued by non-
financial corporations, BIS-IDSD 
Dollar-denominated international debt(%):Government sector – The share of the dollar-











Table 2: Factors Affecting the Five Links, 1989-2014  
 Link 1: ST-rate (CEs)  
ST-rate (PHs) 
Link 2:ST-rate (CEs)  
REER (PHs) 
Link 3: REER (CEs)  
REER (PHs) 
Link 4: REER (CEs)  
EMP (PHs) 
Link 5: REER (CEs)  
Stock Market (PHs) 
 LDC EMG LDC EMG LDC EMG LDC EMG LDC EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.087 0.200 2.486 2.990 0.779 0.862 -8.357 -7.307 0.246 0.394 
 (0.265) (0.294) (0.648)*** (0.748)*** (0.072)*** (0.087)*** (2.261)*** (2.735)*** (0.254) (0.316) 
Financial Openness 0.461 0.531 0.282 0.648 0.093 -0.029 -4.564 -4.810 0.060 0.115 
 (0.228)** (0.257)** (0.546) (0.657) (0.060) (0.076) (1.833)** (2.280)** (0.197) (0.245) 
IR Holding -0.898 -0.788 -0.163 -0.252 0.806 0.610 0.912 2.192 -0.590 -1.252 
 (0.680) (0.833) (1.904) (2.205) (0.210)*** (0.255)** (5.904) (7.793) (0.567) (0.801) 
CA balance (%) 0.393 -0.539 -0.249 0.477 -0.165 0.020 -10.936 -10.536 -2.346 -2.312 
 (0.959) (1.238) (2.766) (3.269) (0.306) (0.378) (7.621) (11.044) (0.752)*** (1.196)* 
Gross debt (%) 0.177 0.200 0.110 0.668 -0.057 -0.103 1.652 0.770 -0.232 -0.272 
 (0.121) (0.126) (0.334) (0.379)* (0.037) (0.044)** (1.041) (1.201) (0.110)** (0.127)** 
Inflation Vol. 1.006 0.829 -2.111 -3.462 -0.191 -0.367 4.210 2.304 -7.381 -9.890 
 (1.713) (1.591) (3.677) (3.803) (0.406) (0.440) (13.842) (14.195) (2.772)*** (3.087)*** 
Trade Comp. -0.442 -0.527 -2.285 -3.033 -0.806 -0.556 13.508 3.740 -0.091 0.260 
 (0.927) (1.005) (2.336) (2.645) (0.258)*** (0.306)* (7.630)* (9.036) (0.752) (0.977) 
Trade demand 1.627 1.728 2.373 2.943 1.294 1.490 0.896 3.277 -0.757 -0.494 
 (1.117) (1.146) (2.420) (2.652) (0.267)*** (0.307)*** (8.967) (9.756) (0.906) (1.033) 
Bank Lending -0.157 0.133 2.860 1.740 -0.090 -0.275 -15.949 -10.734 -0.022 0.064 
 (0.452) (0.590) (1.508)* (1.689) (0.167) (0.195) (5.000)*** (5.369)** (0.462) (0.519) 
Fin. Dev. 0.078 0.071 -0.022 0.065 -0.059 -0.040 -0.389 -0.328 0.118 0.135 
 (0.038)** (0.040)* (0.099) (0.109) (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.336) (0.384) (0.034)*** (0.038)*** 
Currency crisis 0.449 0.384 -1.582 -1.590 -0.121 -0.099 3.523 0.931 0.091 0.117 
 (0.245)* (0.249) (0.589)*** (0.646)** (0.065)* (0.075) (2.018)* (2.198) (0.199) (0.226) 
Banking crisis -0.364 -0.358 1.276 0.909 -0.005 -0.113 2.551 3.020 -0.538 -0.344 
 (0.219)* (0.238) (0.480)*** (0.575) (0.053) (0.067)* (1.764) (2.159) (0.188)*** (0.230) 
N 809 590 641 499 641 499 782 581 570 473 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.27 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.13 
# of countries 63 39 46 32 46 32 61 38 40 32 
years 1989-2014 1989-2014 1992-2014 1992-2014 1992-2014 1992-2014 1989-2014 1989-2014 1992-2014 1992-2014 
F-test, OMP  0.16  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.63  0.35 
F-test, Macro  0.34  0.38  0.94  0.21  0.26  0.07  0.28  0.78  0.00  0.00 
F-test, Ext. Link  0.55  0.42  0.09  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.25  0.81  0.97 
F-test, Inst. Dev.  0.04  0.08  0.82  0.55  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.39  0.00  0.00 
F-test, All  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The second estimation is conducted 
for the estimates 
C
Fi̂  from the first-step estimation that does not include China as one of the center economies. Time fixed effects for the three-year panels and the constant 
are also included, though their estimates are not reported.
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Table 3: Effect of Currency Zones, 1989-2014  
Link 1 – CEs: ST rate in the CEs  PHs: ST rate  
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.091 0.087 0.075 0.094 0.079 0.046 0.141 0.144 0.176 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.205) (0.257) (0.258) (0.262) (0.278) (0.282) (0.287) 
$ zone weight (𝜃6
𝑈𝑆) 0.111  0.176 0.192  0.773 0.105  -0.263 
 (0.161)  (0.347) (0.243)  (0.820) (0.257)  (0.999) 
US gamma x  -0.364  -0.352 -0.440  -0.444 -0.485  -0.496 
dollar zone weight (𝜃7
𝑈𝑆) (0.201)*  (0.203)* (0.263)*  (0.266)* (0.265)*  (0.267)* 
Euro zone weight (𝜃6
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  -0.036 -0.012  0.160 0.684  0.199 -0.285 
  (0.194) (0.386)  (0.282) (0.843)  (0.301) (1.027) 
Euro area gamma   0.277 0.260  -0.298 -0.280  -0.294 -0.319 
x euro zone Weight (𝜃7
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  (0.344) (0.348)  (0.559) (0.562)  (0.577) (0.575) 
Financial Openness 0.359 0.347 0.372 0.482 0.431 0.545 0.562 0.547 0.482 
 (0.164)** (0.162)** (0.164)** (0.222)** (0.224)* (0.244)** (0.246)** (0.247)** (0.222)** 
IR Holding -0.568 -0.580 -0.584 -1.044 -0.907 -0.795 -0.977 -0.791 -1.044 
 (0.481) (0.475) (0.481) (0.656) (0.666) (0.772) (0.772) (0.778) (0.656) 
Link 2 – CEs: Change in ST-rate  PH: REER changes 
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exch. Rate Stability 1.532 1.468 1.513 2.091 2.096 2.243 2.451 2.390 2.526 
 (0.465)*** (0.472)*** (0.477)*** (0.622)*** (0.627)*** (0.637)*** (0.721)*** (0.719)*** (0.738)*** 
$ zone weight (𝜃6
𝑈𝑆) -0.483  -0.408 -0.377  -2.298 -0.611  -1.601 
 (0.367)  (0.748) (0.568)  (1.770) (0.681)  (2.351) 
US gamma x  0.025  0.029 -0.084  -0.161 -0.348  -0.363 
dollar zone weight (𝜃7
𝑈𝑆) (0.479)  (0.486) (0.622)  (0.630) (0.698)  (0.701) 
Euro zone weight (𝜃6
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  0.412 0.037  0.150 -2.146  0.640 -1.152 
  (0.415) (0.818)  (0.616) (1.793)  (0.740) (2.408) 
Euro area gamma   0.101 0.156  0.458 0.454  0.290 0.340 
x euro zone Weight (𝜃7
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  (0.722) (0.733)  (1.200) (1.210)  (1.360) (1.373) 
Financial Openness -0.071 -0.034 -0.063 0.482 0.458 0.519 0.958 0.920 0.985 
 (0.378) (0.374) (0.379) (0.532) (0.533) (0.539) (0.635) (0.631) (0.638) 
IR Holding 1.566 1.491 1.563 0.446 0.439 0.244 -0.074 -0.047 -0.174 
 (1.308) (1.296) (1.312) (1.828) (1.831) (1.853) (2.081) (2.066) (2.086) 
Link 3 – CEs: Change in REER   PHs: Change in REER  
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.589 0.592 0.583 0.635 0.696 0.648 0.738 0.795 0.751 
 (0.055)*** (0.056)*** (0.056)*** (0.069)*** (0.070)*** (0.069)*** (0.082)*** (0.084)*** (0.084)*** 
$ zone weight (𝜃6
𝑈𝑆) -0.116  -0.120 -0.060  -0.096 -0.063  -0.030 
 (0.043)***  (0.087) (0.063)  (0.191) (0.078)  (0.268) 
US gamma x  0.364  0.376 0.403  0.411 0.354  0.372 
dollar zone weight (𝜃7
𝑈𝑆) (0.056)***  (0.057)*** (0.069)***  (0.068)*** (0.080)***  (0.080)*** 
Euro zone weight (𝜃6
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  -0.075 -0.111  -0.201 -0.156  -0.159 -0.072 
  (0.049) (0.095)  (0.069)*** (0.194)  (0.086)* (0.274) 
Euro area gamma   0.382 0.404  0.416 0.433  0.315 0.370 
x euro zone Weight (𝜃7
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  (0.086)*** (0.085)***  (0.134)*** (0.131)***  (0.159)** (0.156)** 
Financial Openness 0.074 0.108 0.077 0.082 0.083 0.080 -0.031 -0.018 -0.033 
 (0.045)* (0.045)** (0.044)* (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) 
IR Holding 0.571 0.575 0.559 0.539 0.709 0.547 0.350 0.472 0.352 




Table 3: Continued 
Link 4 – CEs: REER changes  PHs: EMP  
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exch. Rate Stability -7.831 -6.918 -6.658 -7.549 -7.239 -7.228 -6.945 -6.633 -7.517 
 (2.118)*** (2.125)*** (2.144)*** (2.177)*** (2.165)*** (2.170)*** (2.620)*** (2.641)** (2.706)*** 
$ zone weight (𝜃6
𝑈𝑆) 0.766  -7.544 -0.172  -4.103 0.312  4.998 
 (1.705)  (3.562)** (2.026)  (6.315) (2.377)  (8.808) 
US gamma x  4.694  3.876 3.649  3.629 5.616  5.556 
dollar zone weight (𝜃7
𝑈𝑆) (2.117)**  (2.132)* (2.174)*  (2.153)* (2.414)**  (2.434)** 
Euro zone weight (𝜃6
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  -0.645 -6.755  1.172 -1.637  0.557 7.277 
  (1.959) (3.904)*  (2.228) (6.457)  (2.675) (9.072) 
Euro area gamma   -10.314 -9.750  -9.132 -9.140  -8.521 -8.168 
x euro zone Weight (𝜃7
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  (3.430)*** (3.466)***  (4.376)** (4.363)**  (5.019)* (5.038) 
Financial Openness -2.831 -2.276 -2.847 -4.613 -4.463 -4.476 -4.855 -4.447 -4.920 
 (1.707)* (1.679) (1.701)* (1.799)** (1.785)** (1.784)** (2.211)** (2.212)** (2.232)** 
IR Holding -12.879 -14.198 -12.963 -1.655 -1.652 -2.204 -2.132 -2.359 -2.295 
 (5.500)** (5.405)*** (5.477)** (5.800) (5.750) (5.749) (7.331) (7.354) (7.405) 
Link 5 – CEs: REER changes  PH: Stock market price changes 
 FULL FULL FULL LDC LDC LDC EMG EMG EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Exch. Rate Stability -0.091 -0.066 -0.130 0.144 0.100 0.104 0.236 0.113 0.206 
 (0.164) (0.172) (0.168) (0.229) (0.239) (0.229) (0.277) (0.293) (0.283) 
$ zone weight (𝜃6
𝑈𝑆) 0.370  0.541 0.538  1.503 0.288  0.661 
 (0.133)***  (0.249)** (0.201)***  (0.602)** (0.237)  (0.856) 
US gamma x  -1.149  -1.126 -1.522  -1.475 -1.772  -1.708 
dollar zone weight (𝜃7
𝑈𝑆) (0.160)***  (0.162)*** (0.208)***  (0.208)*** (0.228)***  (0.229)*** 
Euro zone weight (𝜃6
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  -0.078 0.207  -0.193 0.846  -0.019 0.185 
  (0.155) (0.268)  (0.232) (0.603)  (0.286) (0.871) 
Euro area gamma   0.194 -0.010  0.746 0.540  1.158 0.682 
x euro zone Weight (𝜃7
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜)  (0.259) (0.253)  (0.451)* (0.433)  (0.531)** (0.504) 
Financial Openness 0.206 0.091 0.209 0.035 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.031 -0.004 
 (0.136) (0.139) (0.136) (0.180) (0.188) (0.180) (0.217) (0.230) (0.218) 
IR Holding -0.612 -0.459 -0.610 -0.532 -0.655 -0.463 -0.430 -0.844 -0.439 
 (0.388) (0.397) (0.388) (0.531) (0.554) (0.531) (0.704) (0.746) (0.710) 
Notes:  The estimations are conducted with the robust regression method due to the existence of outliers. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
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Table 4: Effects of External Debt 
Link 1 CEs: ST rate in the CEs  PHs: ST rate 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.087 0.033 -0.195 -0.179 -0.314 -0.281 -0.178 0.200 0.185 0.223 0.161 0.116 0.052 0.175 
 (0.265) (0.261) (0.381) (0.391) (0.428) (0.383) (0.387) (0.294) (0.303) (0.429) (0.457) (0.526) (0.427) (0.426) 
Financial Openness 0.461 0.474 0.512 0.517 0.496 0.551 0.519 0.531 0.473 0.657 0.658 0.514 0.652 0.658 
 (0.228)** (0.233)** (0.345) (0.346) (0.381) (0.345) (0.344) (0.257)** (0.266)* (0.387)* (0.387)* (0.454) (0.385)* (0.387)* 
IR Holding -0.898 -1.007 -1.068 -1.063 -1.080 -0.723 -1.134 -0.788 -0.767 -1.052 -1.004 -0.901 -0.257 -0.994 
 (0.680) (0.663) (1.050) (1.044) (1.170) (1.098) (1.079) (0.833) (0.844) (1.312) (1.327) (1.683) (1.488) (1.322) 
International debt  0.153       0.423      
As % of GNI  (0.660)       (0.779)      
External debt   0.001       -0.055     
as % exports   (0.140)       (0.189)     
External debt    -0.036       0.032    
as % of GNI    (0.374)       (0.491)    
Short-term debt     -0.812       -0.794   
as % of Exports     (0.833)       (1.060)   
Short-term debt      -0.992       -1.080  
as % of External debt      (1.040)       (1.178)  
Short-term debt       -0.116       0.013 
as % of IR       (0.293)       (0.333) 
N 809 723 532 532 511 532 532 590 572 377 377 356 377 377 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
# of countries 63 53 44 44 44 44 44 39 38 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Link 2 – CEs: Change in ST-rate  PH: REER changes 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)   
Exch. Rate Stability 2.486 2.818 2.286 2.238 2.233 2.179 2.391 2.990 3.386 3.520 3.951 3.217 3.357 3.413 
 (0.648)*** (0.667)*** (0.871)*** (0.903)** (0.941)** (0.894)** (0.892)*** (0.748)*** (0.786)*** (0.907)*** (0.997)*** (1.070)*** (0.999)*** (0.921)*** 
Financial Openness 0.282 0.496 0.078 -0.022 -0.133 -0.039 -0.094 0.648 0.781 0.902 0.656 0.816 0.763 0.808 
 (0.546) (0.584) (0.802) (0.807) (0.815) (0.803) (0.799) (0.657) (0.682) (0.911) (0.926) (0.954) (0.919) (0.921) 
IR Holding -0.163 0.198 -0.885 -1.114 -1.963 -1.240 -2.873 -0.252 -0.114 -0.047 1.278 0.340 0.679 -0.780 
 (1.904) (1.921) (3.167) (3.226) (3.279) (3.198) (3.453) (2.205) (2.237) (3.161) (3.266) (3.364) (3.287) (3.411) 
International debt   -4.853       -4.330      
as % of GNI  (1.982)**       (2.374)*      
External debt   -0.518       -1.069     
as % exports   (0.348)       (0.501)**     
External debt    -0.140       -1.935    
as % of GNI    (0.905)       (1.217)    
Short-term debt     -3.470       -2.822   
as % of Exports     (2.106)       (2.417)   
Short-term debt      -0.302       1.130  
as % of External debt      (2.717)       (3.222)  
Short-term debt       -0.664       -0.989 
as % of IR       (0.668)       (0.751) 
N 641 589 372 372 363 372 372 499 490 284 284 275 284 284 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 
# of countries 46 41 28 28 28 28 28 32 32 18 18 18 18 18 
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Link 3 – CEs: Change in REER   PHs: Change in REER 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.779 0.801 0.671 0.709 0.652 0.664 0.685 0.862 0.881 0.863 0.964 0.813 0.847 0.849 
 (0.072)*** (0.074)*** (0.092)*** (0.094)*** (0.098)*** (0.094)*** (0.094)*** (0.087)*** (0.089)*** (0.107)*** (0.113)*** (0.123)*** (0.116)*** (0.107)*** 
Financial Openness 0.093 0.071 -0.014 -0.003 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.029 -0.040 -0.170 -0.177 -0.162 -0.180 -0.183 
 (0.060) (0.065) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.076) (0.077) (0.107) (0.105)* (0.110) (0.107)* (0.107)* 
IR Holding 0.806 0.772 0.958 1.014 0.999 0.973 0.876 0.610 0.641 0.790 0.937 0.930 0.872 0.892 
 (0.210)*** (0.214)*** (0.336)*** (0.336)*** (0.340)*** (0.335)*** (0.362)** (0.255)** (0.252)** (0.372)** (0.369)** (0.387)** (0.382)** (0.397)** 
International debt  0.164       0.150      
As % of GNI  (0.220)       (0.268)      
External debt   -0.025       -0.069     
as % exports   (0.037)       (0.059)     
External debt    -0.162       -0.389    
as % of GNI    (0.094)*       (0.137)***    
Short-term debt     -0.414       -0.427   
as % of Exports     (0.219)*       (0.278)   
Short-term debt      -0.169       -0.067  
as % of External debt      (0.284)       (0.375)  
Short-term debt       -0.040       0.039 
as % of IR       (0.070)       (0.087) 
N 641 589 372 372 363 372 372 499 490 284 284 275 284 284 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.32 
# of countries 46 41 28 28 28 28 28 32 32 18 18 18 18 18 
Link 4 – CEs: REER changes  PHs: EMP 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Exch. Rate Stability -8.357 -8.742 -9.272 -9.598 -10.610 -9.389 -9.406 -7.307 -6.679 -12.201 -14.252 -11.513 -8.252 -11.554 
 (2.261)*** (2.324)*** (3.199)*** (3.278)*** (3.561)*** (3.183)*** (3.273)*** (2.735)*** (2.757)** (4.490)*** (4.766)*** (5.279)** (4.410)* (4.405)*** 
Financial Openness -4.564 -4.408 -5.021 -5.164 -6.070 -5.664 -5.037 -4.810 -3.701 -8.556 -8.428 -9.375 -8.341 -8.214 
 (1.833)** (1.961)** (2.646)* (2.663)* (2.842)** (2.638)** (2.652)* (2.280)** (2.302) (3.739)** (3.705)** (4.051)** (3.642)** (3.731)** 
IR Holding 0.912 2.664 8.122 7.981 5.500 6.569 8.786 2.192 -1.180 14.473 12.242 -5.565 -6.093 15.503 
 (5.904) (6.145) (8.893) (8.964) (9.609) (8.939) (9.191) (7.793) (7.723) (14.176) (14.328) (17.023) (15.420) (14.136) 
International debt  -8.077       -12.042      
As % of GNI  (5.851)       (6.632)*      
External debt   0.474       3.497     
as % exports   (1.137)       (1.943)*     
External debt    1.099       7.092    
as % of GNI    (2.968)       (4.880)    
Short-term debt     7.910       18.316   
as % of Exports     (6.177)       (9.263)**   
Short-term debt      14.792       37.532  
as % of External debt      (8.002)*       (11.245)***  
Short-term debt       0.676       4.291 
as % of IR       (2.325)       (3.224) 
N 782 696 502 502 481 502 502 581 563 365 365 344 365 365 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.05 





Link 5 – CEs: REER changes  PH: Stock market price changes 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.246 0.214 1.688 1.737 1.751 1.603 1.659 0.394 0.224 1.872 1.824 1.447 1.290 1.518 
 (0.254) (0.269) (0.423)*** (0.430)*** (0.419)*** (0.425)*** (0.427)*** (0.316) (0.328) (0.522)*** (0.526)*** (0.505)*** (0.538)** (0.521)*** 
Financial Openness 0.060 0.051 0.590 0.613 0.511 0.462 0.509 0.115 0.193 0.360 0.418 0.352 0.202 0.319 
 (0.197) (0.211) (0.316)* (0.330)* (0.308)* (0.315) (0.311) (0.245) (0.250) (0.358) (0.367) (0.352) (0.362) (0.360) 
IR Holding -0.590 -0.388 -2.213 -2.056 -2.084 -1.892 -2.022 -1.252 -0.969 -3.350 -2.944 -2.354 -2.114 -3.568 
 (0.567) (0.613) (0.916)** (0.910)** (0.898)** (0.917)** (0.953)** (0.801) (0.805) (1.407)** (1.426)** (1.385)* (1.473) (1.422)** 
International debt  0.044       -0.196      
As % of GNI  (0.610)       (0.669)      
External debt   -0.157       -0.270     
as % exports   (0.129)       (0.186)     
External debt    -0.327       -0.551    
as % of GNI    (0.407)       (0.565)    
Short-term debt     -2.616       -3.387   
as % of Exports     (0.756)***       (0.851)***   
Short-term debt      -1.103       -2.245  
as % of External debt      (0.953)       (1.131)**  
Short-term debt       0.014       -0.691 
as % of IR       (0.259)       (0.392)* 
N 570 545 310 310 310 310 310 473 466 271 271 271 271 271 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.16 
# of countries 40 38 22 22 22 22 22 32 31 18 18 18 18 18 




Table 5: Effects of External Debt and Currency Weights 
Link 1 CEs: ST rate in the CEs  PHs: ST rate 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.087 0.124 -0.251 -0.010 0.492 -0.028 0.200 0.234 -0.130 -0.011 0.500 0.054 
 (0.265) (0.296) (0.381) (0.342) (0.403) (0.334) (0.294) (0.331) (0.435) (0.446) (0.444) (0.353) 
Financial Openness 0.461 0.444 0.645 0.374 0.639 0.543 0.531 0.640 0.700 0.456 0.666 0.498 
 (0.228)** (0.254)* (0.344)* (0.283) (0.353)* (0.286)* (0.257)** (0.279)** (0.394)* (0.328) (0.359)* (0.303) 
IR Holding -0.898 -0.965 -1.272 -0.928 -0.674 -0.893 -0.788 -0.831 -0.998 -0.483 -0.623 -0.666 
 (0.680) (0.709) (1.053) (0.765) (1.058) (0.824) (0.833) (0.916) (1.358) (1.049) (1.098) (1.023) 
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)  -0.271      -0.140     
  (0.298)      (0.349)     
Dollar share x US gamma  -0.222      -0.350     
  (0.287)      (0.289)     
Public debt    -0.512      -0.241    
denominated in USD (%)   (0.542)      (0.569)    
Dollar share (PPG) x US gamma   -0.471      -0.827    
   (0.578)      (0.599)    
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     0.174      0.054   
Financial Inst.    (0.277)      (0.346)   
Dollar share x US gamma    -0.723      -0.703   
Financial Inst.    (0.289)**      (0.301)**   
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     -0.567      -0.747  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.351)      (0.389)*  
Dollar share x US gamma     -0.286      -0.397  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.313)      (0.312)  
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)\      0.022      0.224 
Gov't sector      (0.360)      (0.370) 
Dollar share x US gamma      -0.160      -0.296 
Gov’t Sector      (0.331)      (0.336) 
N 809 565 532 545 429 553 590 445 377 426 372 468 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.01 





Link 2 – CEs: Change in ST-rate  PH: REER changes 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exch. Rate Stability 2.486 3.306 2.385 3.684 4.639 3.476 2.990 3.862 3.182 4.515 5.091 3.733 
 (0.648)*** (0.768)*** (0.909)*** (0.979)*** (1.196)*** (0.882)*** (0.748)*** (0.918)*** (0.937)*** (1.294)*** (1.375)*** (0.951)*** 
Financial Openness 0.282 0.666 0.255 0.559 0.786 -0.048 0.648 1.167 1.392 1.079 1.045 0.293 
 (0.546) (0.645) (0.827) (0.728) (0.919) (0.737) (0.657) (0.775) (0.990) (0.935) (0.996) (0.805) 
IR Holding -0.163 -0.488 -1.570 0.134 -0.148 -1.955 -0.252 -0.753 0.121 -0.495 0.240 -1.519 
 (1.904) (2.203) (3.206) (2.546) (2.960) (2.726) (2.205) (2.603) (3.190) (3.075) (3.290) (2.932) 
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)  -1.308      -1.351     
  (0.761)*      (1.007)     
Dollar share x US gamma  0.019      -0.625     
  (0.714)      (0.800)     
Public debt    -1.526      -2.084    
denominated in USD (%)   (1.268)      (1.301)    
Dollar share (PPG) x US gamma   0.882      0.834    
   (1.339)      (1.261)    
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     -0.281      -0.162   
Financial Inst.    (0.711)      (1.033)   
Dollar share x US gamma    -0.125      -1.153   
Financial Inst.    (0.727)      (0.867)   
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     -1.410      -2.544  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.893)      (1.079)**  
Dollar share x US gamma     -0.640      -0.844  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.831)      (0.895)  
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)\      -1.820      -1.805 
Gov't sector      (0.897)**      (0.990)* 
Dollar share x US gamma      0.864      0.489 
Gov’t Sector      (0.865)      (0.913) 
N 641 512 372 472 388 466 499 422 284 391 352 415 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 
# of countries 46 34 28 36 30 35 32 27 18 28 25 30 
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Link 3 – CEs: Change in REER   PHs: Change in REER  
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.779 0.780 0.707 0.918 1.021 0.877 0.862 0.855 0.858 1.048 1.125 0.961 
 (0.072)*** (0.085)*** (0.096)*** (0.105)*** (0.123)*** (0.100)*** (0.087)*** (0.105)*** (0.111)*** (0.131)*** (0.138)*** (0.107)*** 
Financial Openness 0.093 0.109 0.015 0.116 0.098 0.056 -0.029 0.044 -0.146 0.027 0.107 0.005 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.087) (0.078) (0.095) (0.083) (0.076) (0.089) (0.118) (0.095) (0.100) (0.091) 
IR Holding 0.806 0.812 0.840 1.121 1.143 0.429 0.610 0.720 0.746 1.048 1.114 0.233 
 (0.210)*** (0.243)*** (0.338)** (0.272)*** (0.306)*** (0.308) (0.255)** (0.297)** (0.379)* (0.311)*** (0.331)*** (0.331) 
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)  -0.081      0.063     
  (0.084)      (0.115)     
Dollar share x US gamma  0.104      0.074     
  (0.079)      (0.091)     
Public debt    -0.182      -0.140    
denominated in USD (%)   (0.134)      (0.155)    
Dollar share (PPG) x US gamma   0.314      0.156    
   (0.141)**      (0.150)    
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     0.038      0.140   
Financial Inst.    (0.076)      (0.105)   
Dollar share x US gamma    0.206      0.156   
Financial Inst.    (0.078)***      (0.088)*   
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     0.138      0.182  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.092)      (0.109)*  
Dollar share x US gamma     0.202      0.105  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.086)**      (0.090)  
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)\      -0.096      -0.120 
Gov't sector      (0.101)      (0.112) 
Dollar share x US gamma      0.316      0.270 
Gov’t Sector      (0.098)***      (0.103)*** 
N 641 512 372 472 388 466 499 422 284 391 352 415 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.27 
# of countries 46 34 28 36 30 35 32 27 18 28 25 30 
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Link 4 – CEs: REER changes  PHs: EMP 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exch. Rate Stability -8.357 -12.503 -8.222 -10.161 -7.234 -11.554 -7.307 -9.988 -5.346 -9.156 -6.606 -10.136 
 (2.261)*** (2.703)*** (3.194)** (3.190)*** (3.346)** (2.829)*** (2.735)*** (3.062)*** (4.599) (3.968)** (3.748)* (3.099)*** 
Financial Openness -4.564 -8.381 -5.065 -7.986 -5.456 -2.525 -4.810 -7.870 -8.998 -8.835 -5.328 -1.959 
 (1.833)** (2.251)*** (2.617)* (2.446)*** (2.727)** (2.283) (2.280)** (2.577)*** (3.720)** (2.918)*** (2.901)* (2.470) 
IR Holding 0.912 -4.293 5.408 -5.966 -8.583 9.426 2.192 -9.726 10.333 -10.120 -3.111 9.620 
 (5.904) (6.857) (8.840) (7.184) (8.615) (7.245) (7.793) (8.883) (14.296) (9.701) (9.293) (9.167) 
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)  -4.599      -4.760     
  (2.655)*      (3.332)     
Dollar share x US gamma  7.932      10.740     
  (2.569)***      (2.708)***     
Public debt    8.584      14.049    
denominated in USD (%)   (4.265)**      (5.556)**    
Dollar share (PPG) x US gamma   9.847      15.947    
   (4.771)**      (5.885)***    
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     -2.646      -3.242   
Financial Inst.    (2.431)      (3.148)   
Dollar share x US gamma    6.007      8.341   
Financial Inst.    (2.520)**      (2.674)***   
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     -0.859      -2.902  
Non-Financial Inst.     (2.653)      (3.118)  
Dollar share x US gamma     8.736      9.585  
Non-Financial Inst.     (2.466)***      (2.603)***  
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)\      -5.318      -4.051 
Gov't sector      (2.803)*      (2.939) 
Dollar share x US gamma      3.476      4.041 
Gov’t Sector      (2.688)      (2.748) 
N 782 550 502 530 415 526 581 445 365 426 373 459 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.05 





Link 5 – CEs: REER changes  PH: Stock market price changes 
 Developing Countries (LDC) Emerging Market Countries (EMG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exch. Rate Stability 0.246 0.008 1.191 -0.268 -0.184 0.358 0.394 0.133 1.164 -0.267 -0.120 0.245 
 (0.254) (0.254) (0.424)*** (0.288) (0.354) (0.330) (0.316) (0.304) (0.504)** (0.356) (0.387) (0.361) 
Financial Openness 0.060 0.327 0.254 0.346 0.322 0.003 0.115 0.369 0.109 0.258 0.239 0.033 
 (0.197) (0.213) (0.310) (0.226) (0.276) (0.249) (0.245) (0.241) (0.358) (0.266) (0.286) (0.263) 
IR Holding -0.590 -0.642 -1.886 -0.585 -1.634 -1.526 -1.252 -1.608 -3.206 -1.437 -1.481 -2.165 
 (0.567) (0.599) (0.892)** (0.598) (0.874)* (0.743)** (0.801) (0.806)** (1.359)** (0.855)* (0.924) (0.967)** 
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)  0.829      1.031     
  (0.258)***      (0.325)***     
Dollar share x US gamma  -1.447      -1.617     
  (0.231)***      (0.249)***     
Public debt    -0.249      -0.387    
denominated in USD (%)   (0.474)      (0.497)    
Dollar share (PPG) x US gamma   -1.919      -1.864    
   (0.491)***      (0.503)***    
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     0.568      0.618   
Financial Inst.    (0.218)***      (0.287)**   
Dollar share x US gamma    -1.408      -1.621   
Financial Inst.    (0.217)***      (0.236)***   
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)     0.258      0.284  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.259)      (0.297)  
Dollar share x US gamma     -1.752      -1.791  
Non-Financial Inst.     (0.245)***      (0.253)***  
Dollar-denom. Int'l debt(%)\      0.847      0.894 
Gov't sector      (0.279)***      (0.304)*** 
Dollar share x US gamma      -1.463      -1.441 
Gov’t Sector      (0.282)***      (0.289)*** 
N 570 470 310 451 374 423 473 401 271 391 350 381 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.24 




Table 6: Summary of the Findings (for LDCs and EMGs) 
Link Factors 
Link 1  
CEs: ST rate in the CEs  PHs: ST rate 
   
 
Open Macro: 
 Financial openness (+) 
  
Currency Weights: 




Currency Composition of International Debt 
 Dollar share in international debt securities issued 
by financial institute (–) 
 
Link 2  
CEs: Change in ST-rate  
 PH: REER changes 
 
Open Macro: 





 External debt (% of exp. or GNI) (–) 
 
Currency Composition of International Debt 
 Dollar share in international debt securities issued 
by government sector (+) 
 
Link 3 
CEs: Change in REER  
  PHs: Change in REER 
Open Macro: 
 Exchange rate stability (+); IR holding (+) 
 
Currency Weights: 
 Dollar weight (+) 
 Euro weight (+) 
 
External Debt: 
 External debt (% of GNI) (–) 
 Short-term debt (as % of IR) (+) 
 
Currency Composition of International Debt 
 Dollar share in international debt securities issued 
by financial institutions, non-financial institutions, 
and government sector (+) 





 Exchange rate stability (–); Financial openness (–) 
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CEs: REER changes  PHs: EMP 
 
Currency Weights: 
 Dollar weight (+) 
 Euro weight (–) 
 
External Debt: 
 External debt (% of exp.) (+) 
 ST debt (% of exp. or total ext. debt) (+) 
 
Currency Composition of International Debt 
 Dollar share in international debt securities issued 
by financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions (+) 




CEs: REER changes  





 Dollar weight (+ for LDC, – for EMG) 
 
External Debt: 
 ST debt (% of exp., total ext. debt, or IR) (–) 
 
Currency Composition of International Debt 
 Dollar share in international debt securities issued 
by financial institutions, non-financial institutions, 
and government sector (–) 























Figure 2: Proportion of Significant F-Tests 
(i) CE: Policy Interest Rate  PH: Policy Interest Rate 
 
(ii) CE: Policy Interest Rate  PH: REER 
 































































































Figure 2: Continued 
(iv) CE: REER PH: EMP 
 





Figure 3: Proportion of Significant ?̂?’s 
(i) CE: Policy Interest Rate  PH: Policy Interest Rate 
 
(ii) CE: Policy Interest Rate  PH: REER  
 


































































Figure 3: Continued 
(iv) CE: REER PH: EMP  
 
 
(v) CE: REER  PH: Stock market price change 
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